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The Hope That Will Not Abide
Ian Sloan
Lecturer, Department of English, Laurentian University
Minister, St. Luke’s United Church
Sudbury, Ontario
I begin this paper with the question, “What is the contrary of hope?”
The answer would seem to be, not despair, but hate. Hate is the
contrary of hope.
Both the word “hate” and the word “hope” shift easily in
common use between verb and noun. “There is a considerable
amount of hate around right now,” we might say, “And not much
hope.” This paper is interested in this shift between verb and noun as
a verbal fact, wanting to hold up for inspection the verbal
characteristics of the word “hate” and the word “hope.” When we
hold these words up for inspection in this way, their emotionality
stands out. “I hate this,” we say; “I hope that …”
The gospel of John, and one synoptic gospel, the gospel of Luke,
direct “hate” in an unexpected way that rewards such inspection.
Taking up the gospel of Luke first: at 14:26, Luke reads, “If any one
comes to me and does not hate his own father and mother and wife
and children and brothers and sisters, yes, and even his own life, he
cannot be my disciple.” The gospel of John, at 12:25, reads, “He who
loves his life loses it, and he who hates his life in this world will keep
it for eternal life.” These are odd, even visceral uses of the verb hate.
They show that something more is involved in the notion of “hate”
than simple “rejecting.” To hate something is not only to reject it, but
to do so in a way that engages the whole person.
Luke uses “hate;” Matthew, in contrast to Luke, has Jesus state
the same interdiction against familial solidarity using “love”:
Matthew’s redaction is, “He who loves father or mother … he who
loves son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me” (10:37).
Matthew’s decision to distinguish on the basis of “love” in contrast to
Luke’s decision to distinguish on the basis of “hate” compares well
with the way “hate” is used in 1 John. In 1 John there is a
contradiction of Luke’s use and the gospel of John’s use: “He who
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hates his brother is in the darkness and walks in the darkness, and
does not know where he is going, because the darkness has blinded
his eyes” (1 John 2:10,11). Though it is likely the letter is referring to
“brothers in faith” and not to a sibling, at bottom is a sense that “hate”
is inappropriate. This use may or may not be a real contradiction of
the Luke and John uses. Hate may well be appropriate in familial
circumstances. Matthew and the writer of first John keep hate away
from home. Luke and the gospel of John give it an active role in life
and family.
The letter to the Ephesians also gives a theologically considered
rejection of the very claims Luke makes: “no man ever hates his own
flesh, but nourishes and cherishes it, as Christ does the church”
(Ephesians 5:29).
Post-structural method will enable us to hold these several uses
of the verb “to hate” in play with each other because post-structural
method helps our resisting the attempt to rationalize or generalize any
import of any of their uses beyond their literary context. It is rather a
structuralist tendency to subsume “hate” within a more positive
emotionality precisely because the coherence of structure rests on a
coherence or connectivity in emotion. Love generally provides that
coherence and connectivity. Thus, I submit, post-structural method
gives us, in contrast to structuralist approaches (if we are so inclined
or disciplined) an experience of the intense emotion of hate. This is
all to the good, because, from my perspective, the engagement of the
whole person that one experiences with hate is sympathetic to the
engagement of the whole person that one experiences in hope. 
What seems clear from these initial observations and comments
about hate and hope is that, not only is the Bible not univocal in either
the emotion of hate, or of hope, that its multi-vocality results in an
opening into the emotions. They will toss us and turn us like a sea. “If
any one comes to me and does not hate his own father and mother and
wife and children and brothers and sisters …” Hate is not to be
repressed. We cannot simply be nice people who do not hate. Yet
“who hates his or her own flesh?” asks the letter to Ephesians. “No
one,” is the writer’s unstated, and unequivocal, answer. As it is with
our flesh, infers the writer, so it is with Christ and the church. If
people are not to hate the flesh, what are they to do? Following the
writer of Ephesians, they cherish the flesh, nourish it, love it. They do
not hate it, and they do not hope for it.
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The vibrant and vital emotion contrasted with hate and elided then
by the writer of Ephesians here is not love: it is hope. Hate is placed
in a position contrary to hope (love, we shall see, is in some other kind
of relationship to hate). Someone who hates his family may not love
his family, but he certainly hopes for his family. It follows that
someone who does not hate his flesh, will not hope for his flesh. With
its insistence on the general resurrection of the dead, the fundamental
tone of Christian apocalyptic is, ironically, lack of hope – and hate –
about the flesh. It is an ironic tone because there is a clear directive in
Christian apocalyptic to love the flesh. John’s gospel articulates this
theme in the pericope in which the resurrected Jesus meets Mary
Magdalene in the garden. The writer of John has Jesus say to Mary,
“Do not touch me, I am not yet ascended to my Father who is in
heaven” (John 20:17). The synoptic gospel handling of this theme is
found in Jesus’ reply to the Sadducees who ask whom a widow is to
be married to in heaven since she has married several brothers who
have all died (Matthew 22:24-30). “There is no giving and receiving
in marriage in heaven,” responds Jesus. So it follows that we, in fact,
cherish the flesh, but we neither hate it, nor hope for it. “Do not touch
me, Mary,” we might suggest the risen Jesus means, “and hate me for
it.” There is a shift in relationship that is apocalyptic.
What strikes me as a sign of our institutional times, and more
specifically, of these times in the university, is the repression of the
emotion of hate. Bureaucratic repression of this very strong emotion is
concomitantly a repression of the emotion of hope. When someone is
impolitic enough to say that “deconstruction is hateful” and mean it,
there is a flurry of rationalizations that deconstruct the saying. Hate is
deconstructively repressed. Such “non-confessing” post-modern
approaches, however, seem not to me to be alone in their tendency to
repress hate. In the theology concerning hope I have read for this paper
I find very little, if any, substantial commitment to the emotionality of
hope. That is not quite accurate. What I find, whether in Jurgen
Moltmann, or Rowan Greer, or Edward Farley, Johanne Baptista Metz
or Ivana Dolejsova, or Paul Ricouer,1 is the certain conviction that while
hope is an emotion and a word, it is not only an emotion and a word.
Because it is not only an emotion and word, but something beyond, and
something more, a concept, hope’s verbal emotionality is discounted.
Because it is not only an emotion and a word, but something beyond,
and something more, hope’s verbality (is there such a word?) as a word
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among words – including and specifically its verbality in relationship to
the verbality of the word hate – is discounted.
I suppose, however, that careful thinkers do see their points of
departure with respect to hope as intellectually sane. Their point is to
be conceptually clarifying. I argue that when we talk about hope we
are talking about a sanity that is more than intellectual, and anything
that anyone can reasonably offer respecting the verbal emotionality
of the word hope may, in fact, be offering to others the prospect of a
sanity that is more than intellectual. 
The imaginative terrain of hate and hope is the wilderness: the
terrain of John the Baptist. John elicited strong emotional reactions of
hate and hope, and expressed his hates and hopes with noteworthy
vigour. The Scriptural evidence suggests that John hated a great deal,
and hoped as much. Given this evidence, it is interesting that
historical-critical method has been used to argue that the early
Christian community was in all practical ways as uncomfortable with
John as the gospels report Herod the tetrarch was. Some critical
analysis suggests the process of redaction in every one of the gospels
works to discount John the Baptist’s place in the narrative of
salvation.2 I would in contrast suggest that it is enlightenment anxiety
with the visceral emotions of both hope and hate – how else to say it?
– that imposes upon the Scripture and upon John this bizarre notion
that competition marks the relationship. 
Take, for example, the famous, “Why, have you come here to
escape the wrath to come? you brood of vipers!” John knows why the
“Pharisees” and “Sadducees” of Matthew, and the “multitudes” of
Luke, have come. They have come to watch, and judge. He expresses
considerable hate for them, and also considerable hope. His approach
with his verbal attack is to break down their judgementalness with
fierce, independent good humour, so that the hope he has for them,
and which he judges they may have for themselves, might be realized
in their lives, whether in his baptism in the Jordan, or somehow else.
He is not really concerned how it happens, nor particularly concerned
that it happens. John’s demeanour, John’s approach, John’s actions,
are consistent with Ephesians’ insistence on the notion that we do not
hate our flesh. We do not hate our flesh: we do not hope for it either.
Our hates and hopes have to do with our lives, values, ethics, politics.




John’s enactment of hate and hope is emotionally and verbally
coherent. John’s emotional and verbal coherence, John’s hate and
hope are at the heart of Jesus’ ministry. There are consequences for
the Christian theology of hope in this emotional and verbal
coherence. I focus my discussion of these consequences by
commenting on a study done by John Wall on the ethical implications
of Paul Ricouer’s theology of hope.
In a recent article John Wall contends that Ricouer develops a
theological ethics that depends on joining a teleological basis for
ethics with a deontological basis.3 The teleological basis is a faith that
goodness is the end by which we judge radical evil. The
deontological basis is a love for justice as an overflowing duty
respecting self and others. For Ricouer, hope (writes Wall) is a
reconciliation of justice and goodness, and of faith and love. The
reconciliation is given to us by God in a moral tragedy called real life. 
Wall observes that Ricouer’s views on hope are significantly less
explicit than his views on faith and love. One reason his views on
hope might be less explicit than his views on faith and love is that an
ethics developed upon the foundations of the good as a teleological
construct and justice as a deontological construct resulting in a hoped
for reconciliation of both in the context of life as a moral tragedy,
while impressive intellectually, misses much of what hope is about.
Ricouer’s system apparently negates hate by directing boundless love
at it. If you negate hate, you eliminate the contrary to hope. If one
develops an ethical system that does not take into account the reality
of the contraries hope and hate, one must repress hope as much as one
represses hate. Where hate is eliminated, thought about hope is not
going to be explicit.
What caught my eye, as I pondered upon these things, was the
way in which Wall had lined up faith in Ricouer with the question of
the good, and love with the question of the true, and arrived at hope
as a response or tonic to life that is a moral tragedy. At the end, Wall
chooses, if Ricouer does not, an aesthetic category to articulate
notions of hope. Wall’s argument with respect to hope is intricately
linked to a notion of the beautiful that he is not explicit himself about;
he does not theorize “moral tragedy.” 
The beautiful is buried, then, in Wall, and perhaps in Ricouer. I
feel there is something here of hate of the flesh in this burying of the
beautiful. More specifically, in light of the relationship between hate
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and hope John’s preaching entailed, I do not see Wall’s understanding
of Ricouer’s ethics developing out of the Baptist’s baptism of Jesus
at all. This disturbs me and interests me, as the yoking of John the
Baptist with the idea of the beautiful may disturb readers. 
How do Wall and (and perhaps) Ricouer get to this place? I
suggest it is because neither takes into consideration that hate and
hope are contraries. Their contrariness is an important aesthetic or
imaginative fact because, as we can see in the case of John the
Baptist, their contrariness warrants both a profound social critique
and a profound sense of humour. In contrast, love and hate negate
each other: they cancel each other out. When they are brought
together, the result is not imaginative clarity, but intellectual
abstraction and confusion. As I have said, Ricouer’s system
apparently negates hate by directing boundless love at it. If one
develops an ethical system that does not take into account the reality
of the contraries hope and hate, one represses hope as much as one
represses hate. Hope is repressed in Ricouer’s thinking. The theology
is a series of negations, an overwhelming series of negations.
As an ordained minister working with a congregation,4 it matters
to me if I use modes of thought that in fact repress hope. It was thus
with interest that I recently read an article by Donald Capps of
Princeton Seminary entitled, “The Pursuit of Unhappiness in
American Congregational Life.”5 Capps observes that he intends to
examine in this article the notion of “happy and unhappy”
congregations and to center his analysis specifically on the
chronically unhappy congregation. He notes that there is a growing
literature on “healthy and unhealthy” congregations and that it had
become the primary focus of the field of congregational study. He
takes a different tack. His impetus for the article was Paul
Watzlawick’s small book, The Situation is Hopeless, but not Serious.6
The book proposes the theory that individuals are extremely adept at
making themselves unhappy. Capps felt the book might well “be
viewed as a commentary on American institutional life in general,
and on the congregation in particular.”7 For my purposes here, I
wonder if the questions of faith, freedom, and the academy might be
considered in light of the tendency of the university as another form
of (North) American institutional life to make itself unhappy? 
What intrigued me in Capps’ appropriation of Watzlawick is the
humour of Watzlawick’s book’s title: The Situation is Hopeless, but
92 Consensus
http://scholars.wlu.ca/consensus/vol31/iss2/7
not Serious. That we could be in a situation that is hopeless, and yet,
not serious, seems to me to be a situation most of the theology and
theory of hope I have read does not entertain. The point is that we
rarely imagine that our hopes, whatever they are and however finely
intelligible, are excessively serious. 
An approach to John the Baptist that begins from his having a
remarkable sense of humour grounded in hate and hope is an
approach, I argue, that, while enabling us to concede that our hopes
can be excessively serious, does not run the risk of trivializing either
our hopes, or us. I suggest the good-humoured glint in the eye of John
the Baptist would be quite enough to safeguard us from that. 
If I were to put words into John the Baptist’s mouth moments
before he was decapitated, they would be something like, “pity the
dancing was not better.” If the dancing had been better, as in,
apocalyptically better, there would have been no cutting off heads out
of jealous spite and intense moral anxiety around sexuality. But of
course, the dancing was not better, and so far, the dancing has not
been good enough anywhere else. 
The words I put into John’s mouth have to do with art; the hate
which the whole episode reveals John expressing is hate directed
toward the anxieties of sexual morality. “Pity the dancing was not
better” gets at both the hope, and the hate. 
In putting the words, “pity the dancing wasn’t better,” into John
the Baptist’s mouth just before he gets his head cut off, I think I am
making explicit the aesthetic quality of hope, the sense that hope is
the apprehension of the beautiful, however we might construct it, and
that apocalyptic hope, and John’s hope, is the judgement of the
beautiful, expressed definitively in the Bible as consummation of the
wedding feast, upon this hateful life of ours. “One is coming after
me,” says John, “who will be greater than I.” The tone of John’s
comment would be a robust (with a good dose of that glint-in-the-eye
humour John has), “And good luck to him, with his baptism of fire.” 
I think that the most intelligible way to describe hope is to
identify it as that engagement of the whole person with art in a
manner after the impression I have sought to give of John the Baptist.
In this light, I conclude with a quotation from poet Vaclav Havel, who
recently stepped down from the Presidency of the Czech Republic.
He defines hope in the passage I leave you with. Please keep your ear
open for the baptismal imagery of water and spirit, but also observe
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how Havel’s hope loses traction at the end, when he uses the word
“hopeless” instead of – what I think he really means – “hateful”:
Hope is … not the same as joy that things are going well, or
willingness to invest in enterprises that are obviously headed for
early success, but, rather, an ability to work for something because it
is good, not just because it stands a chance to succeed. The more
unpropitious the situation in which we demonstrate hope, the deeper
that hope is. Hope is definitely not the same thing as optimism. It is
not the conviction that something will turn out well, but the certainty
that something makes sense, regardless of how it turns out. In short,
I think that the deepest and most important form of hope, the only
one that can keep us above water and urge us to good works, and the
only true source of the breathtaking dimension of the human spirit
and its efforts, is something we get, as it were, from “elsewhere.” It
is also this hope, above all, which gives us the strength to live and
continually to try new things, even in conditions that seem as
hopeless as ours do, here and now.8
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